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Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of
Intellectual Property and Antitrust
By Susan K. Sell
State University of New York Press, 1998, pp. 289
REVIEWED BY Luclo LANUCARA"
INTRODUCTION
Issues of intellectual property and antitrust have steadily become more
integrated in the last couple of decades.' After the end of colonialism, such
issues rapidly became relevant in the dialogue between the industrialized
North and the developing South. In fact, the developing countries soon
concluded that the prevailing modes of technology transfers and business
practices favored the richer countries and their corporations, and that they,
therefore, needed to redefine the rules underlying those transactions.2
Susan K. Sell, in her recent study Power and Ideas: North-South Politics
ofIntellectual Property andAntitrust (Power and Ideas), analyzes these issues
from a political history perspective. She attempts to explain how changes in
the balance of power and the spread of ideas have affected the negotiation,
adoption, and implementation of an international set of rules on intellectual
property and antitrust. Power and Ideas is an opportunity to revisit an
important historical period in international relations and to acquire a better
understanding of the development of North-South politics. Sell explores both
the reasons behind the outcome of negotiations for a New International
Economic Order (NIEO) and the changing attitudes of developing countries
* LL.M. Candidate, The Honorable James J. Robinson International Law Fellow, Graduate Scholar
for Antitrust Studies Abroad, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.A. European Law and
Economics, University of Rome "La Sapienza" (1998); J.D., University of Rome "La Sapienza" (1995).
1. For an understanding of the connections between antitrust and intellectual property issues in the
1980s and in the 1990s, see W.L Fugate, Antitrust Aspects of International Patent and Technology
Licensing, 5 J.L & COM. 433 (1985), and J. H. Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation:
Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade after the GA TT s Uruguay Round,
20 BRooK. L REV. 75 (1993).
2. See SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, NORTH-SOuTH POLIcs OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ANTITRUST 57-64 (1998).
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in the wake of diplomatic failures and the sweeping economic crisis during the
1980s.
The book is much more about methods of political analyses than about
intellectual property and antitrust issues. The author herself, in the
introductory chapter, indicates that her work attempts to validate her
systematic approach in lieu of the traditional theories of political analysis.'
This premise affects the structure of the book. Sell analyzes negotiations
within three political events: (1) establishment of an international code for the
transfer of technology; (2) reform. of the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (Paris Convention); and (3) adoption of an international
code of conduct on restrictive business practices. Sell sharply separates and
independently treats these legally historic events, but intends them to buttress
her overall political theory. The facts thus do not stand on their own but,
instead, become a part of her theoretical model.
Power and Ideas is divided into six chapters, complemented by a short
introduction and more substantive conclusions. The first two chapters
introduce the book's aim, the relevant historical background, and the
traditional methods of analysis. The third chapter analyzes the negotiations
for an international code of conduct regarding the transfer of technology. The
fourth chapter describes the attempt to revise the Paris Convention. The fifth
and sixth chapters analyze the negotiation, adoption, and use of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Code of Conduct
for the control of restrictive business practices and provide further historical
information on the adoption of antitrust and intellectual property laws in
developing countries. The book concludes by expounding the role of ideas
in the adoption and implementation of intellectual property protection and
antitrust rules in the developing world.
I. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND POLmCAL ANALYSES
Sell's reflections focus upon the historical events surrounding the
negotiations undertaken by industrialized and developing countries since the
3. Id. at 5-6.
[Vol. 6:757
BOOK REVIEW
1970s.4 She reviews the complete political failure that the developing
countries encountered in these negotiations and the new attitudes and policies
those countries adopted in the 1980s under the pressure of globalization and
sweeping international economic crisis. Sell investigates not only the results
of, but also the reasons for, such failures. She outlines the causes for different
political strategies and varying degrees of law enforcement in the fields of
intellectual property and antitrust within developing countries.' Sell posits
that ideas and perceptions of policy goals prove fundamental in shaping
historical developments and thus merit careful attention. In short, her thesis
argues the necessity of a historical approach that examines ideas, power
relationships, and structures of States.
To achieve her goal, Sell initially refers to the other traditional theories of
political analysis that evaluate history based on balances of power or
calculations of interests. She then exposes their inadequacies and, throughout
the remainder of her work, attempts to demonstrate the superiority of her own
analytical model-namely, Interpretivist Neoliberalism.6  Sell criticizes
several methods of analysis but focuses primarily on two significant theories,
Structural Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism.' Sell argues that both
mainstream analyses fail to provide a complete description of political
developments and to explain the different political outcomes where countries
have similar power relationships precisely because these methods fail to
consider the role of ideas. According to Sell, Structural Neorealism, by
concentrating only on the structure of power relationships, ignores the
diversity of responses in national policies and the changes sought in the
multilateral system. Neoliberal Institutionalism, by focusing solely on how
national self-interest drives the international order, disregards how a nation's
perception of self-interest can change in different times and areas of law.8 As
Sell concludes, "analyses that focus solely on power considerations or
4. These negotiations occurred in the following years: 1974-1985 (international code on the transfer
of technology), 1980-1984 (revision of the Paris Convention), 1975-1980 (UNCTAD Code on restrictive
business practices).
5. SELL, supra note 2, at 176-216.
6. Id. at21.
7. Id. at 12-14 (mentioning other theories such as Structural Marxism and World System Theory, and
also asserting that these theories suffer from the same deficiencies as neorealist theories).
8. See id. at 17-27.
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instrumental calculations of interests obscure as much as they reveal." On the
other hand, Interpretative Neoliberalism, by recognizing the relationship
between ideas and interests, reveals the content of national interests, how they
are perceived and defined, and how they change over time.'0 For this reason,
only the latter theory explains the policy changes and political reactions of
developing countries during these negotiations.
Sell's work is extremely accurate in this section. She describes
Interpretivist Neoliberalism thoroughly and supports it with well-documented
facts that clearly delineate the limits of other possible theories. The conflicts
between the different possible methods of analysis are clear even to those not
familiar with political science scholarship. Furthermore, the factual evidence
is well-composed. In every chapter, Sell combines the description of events
with an analysis of ideas, suggesting the impossibility of understanding facts
without considering ideas. In sum, this section fully achieves the goals of
introducing the reader to complex issues of political analyses and supporting,
in a convincing manner, the main theory of the book.
II. NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CODE ON THE
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
Sell initially explains why negotiations for an international code regarding
the transfer of technology became particularly relevant in the 1970s
international scene. After World War I, the international economic order
promoted by the United States favored an unprecedented growth of trade;
during that period, technology transfer was market-led, like any other utility,
and policymakers in developing countries did not regard it as a crucial
international political issue. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, developing
countries gradually challenged the prevailing system of foreign investment and
technology transfer led by multinational corporations on the grounds that it
was designed to favor only the corporation without taking into account the
advancement of developing countries. Finally, in the late 1960s and early
1970s, many developing countries adopted regional and national legislation
9. Id. at39.
10. Id. at 25.
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to regulate the transfer of technology in a manner coherent with their own
policy goals."
Sell shows how such developments led Third World countries to seek the
establishment of a NIEO in which foreign investment, technology transfer, and
economic development were all considered. The gradual awareness of ideas
about technological transfers, which led the developing countries to adopt a
unified approach, assumed a position of relative weakness within developed
countries. Developed countries experienced slower economic growth and
feared that developing countries would exacerbate the situation by adopting
unilateral actions on some commodities, similar to those restrictions adopted
by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).'
Once again, the starting point of Sell's political analysis is the role of
interests and ideas. Sell, using such a historical background, explains the
dynamics of the negotiations, the interests at stake, and the policy goals that
arose during the adoption of an international code of conduct for the transfer
of technology. She describes in detail the negotiations that took place
between the Group of 7713 and the industrialized bloc. She demonstrates that
the leading policies and ideas of the developed countries were to avoid or limit
the relevance of any agreement. For this reason, even when the momentum
was favorable to the developing countries, who had been able to "set the
agenda" of the international negotiations, it was not possible to reach any
substantial result. The change of leadership in the United States, the
bureaucratic inefficiencies of UNCTAD, and the world economic crisis
primarily caused this negotiative failure. 4
Sell analyzes the actions of three subjects: developing countries,
developed countries, and the negotiators. The developing countries, taking
advantage of their situation of relative power, and hoping to implement the
ideas supporting their redefinition of policies, attempted to reach a binding
agreement on the transfer of technology that would give the State the power
11. Id. at 79. Sell refers particularly to the legislation adopted by the Andean Pact, a group of
countries within the Andean Common Market (ANCOM). In 1970, the Andean Pact adopted Decision 24,
which first addressed the issue of technology inputs, patents, and trademarks with an express focus on
development issues rather than market issues. Other leading legislation included the Andean Pact's
Investment Code, or the ANCOM Investment Code. Sell further mentions legislation adopted by Mexico,
Brazil and Argentina. Id. at 81-86.
12. See id. at 66-76.
13. The so-called "Group of 77" was the negotiating bloc of the developing countries in the UNCTAD
fonu. Id. at 67.
14. Id. at98.
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to "balance" the position of force of international corporations. The North,
intimidated by this economic and political scenario, was forced to accept
negotiations, but never shared the views at the base of the NIEO. The
negotiators tried to reach acceptable compromises, but finally faced a loss of
faith in UNCTAD by both groups.
Sell carefully identifies the tension between interests and ideas. She
subsequently provides a clear and descriptive review of the dramatic shifts of
power in the 1980s and the redefinition of interests by developing countries
under the pressure of massive international recession. Using Sell's principles,
it is easy for the reader to understand why the redefinition of policies was
determined not only by the new social and economic conditions, but also by
the example set by the "Asian Tigers," who developed dramatically in the
span of only a few years by liberalizing trade restrictions and establishing
favorable conditions for foreign investment." The pressures of economic
crisis and the example set by many Asian countries preceded the change in
attitude by the United States under the Reagan administration. This attitude
was sharply hostile to the NIEO and to the bureaucracy of the UNCTAD, a
conference perceived as too partisan in favor of the developing countries. 6
Sell, in this section, capably explains how the unresolved issues in the
negotiation exposed irreconcilable differences between the developed
countries and the Group of 77. For instance, whereas developing countries
believed the final document should be binding, developed countries contended
that only a non-binding agreement would be acceptable. 7 Sell mainly focuses
on the political meaning of the events. Goals, policies, and ideas of the three
main actors-developed countries, developing countries, and
negotiators-serve as the object of the narration. Sell succeeds in coherently
developing her plot in favor of her historical approach. The focus on the
political aspects of the events, however, partially ignores the substantial
15. Id. at 102-06.
16. Id. at 101.
17. On most issues, positions were sharply different For instance, while developed countries
identified restrictive business practices with anti-competitive behavior in the sense commonly understood
in the majority of antitrust laws, developing countries considered restrictive business practices to include
all those practices that could have negative effects on development Sell describes in great detail how the
development of negotiations was a history of power in which the developing countries had to make a series
of concessions to the more inflexible developed countries. In the end, the substantial change in the
proposed code made it uninteresting even to the countries that had promoted its adoption. The impossibility
to go any further with the negotiations had a strong psychological impact comparable, in negative, to the
impact OPEC fostered by supporting the action of the Group of 77 in the early 1970s. Id.
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economic and legal issues, which elucidate the connections between events
and the causes of political and ideological development.
III. NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE REFORM OF THE PARIS CONVENTION
Sell opines that the attempt to amend the Paris Convention is similar to the
attempt at a code for technological transfers. The negotiations for the reform
of the Paris Convention occurred between 1980 and 1984. The bloc of
developing countries hoped to draft a code allowing State control over the use
of patents similar to the ones already existing in many countries. In particular,
the developing countries were concerned with what they considered abuses of
patents by recipients-mainly, not using the patents or getting them only for
the purpose of excluding competitors from a market."
Sell succeeds in describing the different interests and ideas supporting the
actions by the States and the resulting imbalance of power. The tension was
primarily between the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the developing countries. Among the
industrialized countries, very few showed sympathy toward the position of the
developing countries. 9 Negotiations continued mainly because of the
insistence from UNCTAD, but with little, if any, enthusiasm from the OECD
and with the developing countries unable to force a change in the situation.
The remedies finally proposed were relatively weak when compared to the
initial requests by the developing countries. Sell goes on to consider how the
outcome was reversed dramatically by a redefinition of interests, in this case
led by the Reagan administration. While initially adhering to the OECD line
(avoiding the adoption of any binding and substantial rule), the United
States-under increasing lobbying pressure from its industrial
groups-decided to consider the issue of intellectual property under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), obtaining significant
18. Constantine Vaitsos, economist and head of the Andean Pact Secretariat's policies on foreign
investment and technology, had a leading role in developing and implementing the ideas representing
developing countries' primary opposition to the current regime of patent protection. Id. at l10-11.
19. See id. at 123 (listing Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey as the only
developed countries that initially showed empathy toward the positions of the developing countries).
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success with the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)
Agreement. 20
Sell again successfully exposes the interaction between power and ideas.
The negotiation began with a momentum of ideas from the developing
countries, supported by a condition of relative power. The incapacity to
transmit acceptance over their ideas, the introduction of new, opposing ideas
by the Reagan administration, and the general reversal of power resulted in
another failure for the Third World.2' Once again, the facts would suggest
that, as Sell affirms, an analysis based solely on power relationships could not
explain the different behaviors between OECD countries and the United
States. Similarly, an analysis based only on national interests would fail to
grasp the forces behind their reshaping.
IV. THE ADOPTION OF THE UNCTAD CODE ON
RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES
The chapters dedicated to the adoption of the UNCTAD Code on
Restrictive Business Practices and to the different approaches on antitrust and
intellectual property defense issues are the least satisfactory. In fact, the
potential force of Sell's argument in comparing intellectual property and
competition is not fully exploited. Had the link between the two areas of law
and policy been better analyzed, the divergent policies adopted by the
developing countries would have strengthened her point that ideas remain
preeminently important. In addition, some data regarding trade and legislation
refer merely to 1991 and, given the fast pace of events in this decade, cannot
be considered very indicative.22
The history of restrictive business practices is quite unique. Sell's
treatment attempts to demonstrate how, given similar power relations, a
different development of ideas and diverging policy choices can nevertheless
result. One particular feature of the negotiation of restrictive practices is that
it actually resulted in the adoption of a code. However, as far as developing
20. Id. Several works analyze TRIPS and its perspectives. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman, From Free
Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the Trips Agreements, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
11 (1997); E.M. Fox, Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property-TRIPS and Its Antitrust
Counterparts, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 481 (1996).
21. See SELL, supra note 2, at 130-39.
22. This is particularly true for the chart regarding the status of antitrust legislation in developing
countries, as updated to August 1991. See id. at 202-03.
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countries were concerned, the outcome remained unsatisfactory, since the
approved document reflected only the interests of the developed countries,
which set the agenda and forced the adoption of a favorable document.' Sell,
in a richly documented description of events, points out that, since the Code's
inception in 1980, it has represented a clash between the most powerful bloc,
which fully achieved its aims, and the developing countries, which remained
bitterly disappointed. Approaches toward the Code's adoption strongly
diverged. The North wished to validate its approach to antitrust law, while the
South contested what it considered to be negative enterprise behavior.24 Even
after its adoption, the Code's reinterpretation by the Reagan administration
evinced more clearly the complete fiasco for the South."
Sell explains that the Code soon lost its imprimatur. Between 1980 and
1989, when consensus from both developed and developing countries
completely evaporated, the Code became a "dead letter." 6 At the end of 1989,
however, the developing countries began drafting and implementing
legislation based on provisions of the Code. Such an outcome, according to
Sell, is attributable to the proposed redefinition of national interests and
consequent adoption of ideas by developed countries. The need to improve
efficiency in an environment steadily more competitive and frequently
pressured by recession forced those countries to open their markets entirely
to market economy.
At this point, the history of antitrust and intellectual property protection
diverges. During the 1980s and 1990s, the new emphasis on deregulation,
privatization, and globalization reshaped national interests in the developing
countries, but only in the antitrust field. In particular, the economic crisis in
the 1980s forced developing countries to embrace elements of a market model
to advance their developmental goals. The same concerns, however, never
applied to intellectual property issues. Developing countries, while keeping
their reservations about intellectual property protection, began approving
antitrust rules as useful tools of economic policy.
Sell accurately notes that an analysis that considered merely power
relations would not explain the differences between antitrust and intellectual
property. For example, in the field of intellectual property, the United States
23. Id. at 157-5S.
24. Id. at 145-48.
25. Id. at 159-62.
26. Id. at 171-73.
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has obtained international codification to its approach both in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and in the TRIPS Agreement. The
United States also has succeeded in using coercive diplomacy to force many
developing countries to strengthen intellectual property protection.17 The
States that adopted this legislation merely as a consequence of power pressure,
however, have refused to enforce them because the ideas represented failed to
transfer. On the other hand, these same countries have reshaped their position
on antitrust, voluntarily adopted legislation, and actually enforced it.
Unfortunately, Sell seems to commit a systematic error not unlike that
found in the theories that she initially refutes. That developing countries have
maintained their old views within intellectual property, despite the pressures
of economic crisis and globalization, is regularly reported but not investigated.
Moreover, Sell never considers the economic reasons that effectuate different
attitudes toward the antitrust approach; she merely reports the switch of ideas.
It would have been useful to include economic factors within her analysis and
to show their relevance to developing countries that advanced antitrust and
intellectual property provisions based on their proposed function of domestic
markets. Sell realizes that new ideas motivate redefinition of national
interests, but never fully explains how economic considerations fuel or limit
these new ideas.
CONCLUSION
Sell's work rests on two concepts-namely, the historical reconstruction
of events and the demonstration of the power of ideas. Sell, however,
emphasizes them differently. As she explains in her introduction, she is
primarily interested in demonstrating the role of ideas and proving the
accuracy of her systematic method. The events described merely provide an
occasion to uphold her analytical approach.
This imbalance between the two leading concepts affects the structure of
the book. In fact, while the role of ideas is demonstrated very accurately, in
some cases, the book lacks a deeper analysis of the legal and economic issues
underlying the events. In particular, Sell rarely accurately analyzes the
negotiated provisions on transfer of technology, protection of patents and
27. Id. at 182-88. For an example of the recently adopted legislation for patent protection, see E.S.
Flores Troy, The Development ofModern Frameworksfor Patent Protection: Mexico, aModelforReform,
6 TEX INMT.L. PROP. L.J. 133 (1998).
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anticompetitive conduct, or the underlying economic implications. The
obvious connections between antitrust and intellectual property issues, even
if hinted at in the conclusion of the book, are not fully developed during the
narration. As a result, Sell's work-in itself remarkable for the amount and
depth of infoimation and for the clarity of its exposition-misses the chance
to reflect on the even more significant meaning of the partially diverging
outcomes in implementation of rules on antitrust and intellectual property
protection in the developing countries. These limitations, which are
concedingly inevitable given the focus of her book, nevertheless obscure some
of the reasons for the relations of power, the reshaping of policy and national
goals, and the interface between intellectual property and antitrust. These
issues could have firther strengthened the arguments that Sell employs to
support her political analysis.
Despite these limitations, Power and Ideas remains a pleasant, well-
organized, and resourceful book. It clearly reveals Sell's political science
background and has value both as a useful political history of little known
events in the twentieth century and as a well-written essay about methods of
political analysis. In addition, Sell's work provides a precious source of
information on the diplomatic efforts in antitrust and intellectual property
negotiations, which otherwise remains very difficult to find.2s Power and
Ideas succeeds in reinforcing the assertion that, in the current wave of
globalization, ideas play a crucial role. In fact, as economies and legislation
become more amalgamated and integrated, the perception of national goals
and interests often makes the difference. How countries define goals and
interests influences their implementation of increasingly homogenous rules.
Power relations between States also tend to become less meaningful as
economies and interest groups become increasingly borderless. Sell's work,
by supporting an analysis especially concerned with ideas, provides an
important tool for a better understanding of the globalized world.
28. In many cases, the bibliographic material is complemented with interviews Sell personally held
with American diplomats, international diplomats, and UNCTAD high bureaucrats. See SELL, supra note
2, at 231-61.
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